



2 NOV 1982

NRO Review Completed.

Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

(TS/B) I welcome the opportunity to summarize Defense's position on [] as you requested. I consider [] to be one of the highest priorities in the National Reconnaissance Program. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the affected Unified and Specified Commanders share this view and believe that this imaging system will significantly enhance the effectiveness of crisis management, the conduct of combat operations and the relevance of current intelligence. It is thus the recommendation of the Department as a whole that the [] program be funded to achieve the earliest practical operational capability.

(TS/B) The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) is structured to satisfy a wide range of national intelligence requirements; the vast majority of the national indications and warning requirements directly support military planning and readiness and are crucial to effective military decisions immediately preceding potential hostilities. This information is the basis of our pre-conflict assessment of enemy capability, force posture, and disposition. If these systems did no more than this, they would be justified and warrant strong Defense support.

(TS/B) Your 13 October 1982 letter correctly pointed out that [] will not support Defense objectives across the entire spectrum of conflict. In fact, none of our national intelligence space systems to date have been funded or designed to operate with assurance in the higher end of the spectrum of conflict.

(TS/B) The DCI and I recognize that many NRP programs have the potential of providing critically needed information at higher levels of conflict when forces are actually engaged. As the level of conflict rises, these NRP assets will become high value targets and would probably come under attack. Additional investments in survivability will be required to assure the availability of the most critical of these resources to the national authorities and to our combat commanders. Consequently, Defense and the DCI have jointly initiated a Reconnaissance Systems Review to examine the National Reconnaissance Program, Defense reconnaissance assets, and the associated command, control and communications to identify those assets which are most critical at higher levels of conflict and to recommend survivability and endurance enhancements.

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-22669

Classified by DoD Instr S-5210.51 (M-1)
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(TS/B) This review is intended to identify potential systems to survive further into the spectrum of conflict. [redacted] is one of the many candidate systems being evaluated for additional survivability enhancements. The review is expected to produce some near-term investment options which, while limited in scope, are clearly warranted. We also anticipate the development of an investment strategy to assist our selection of the proper mix of survivability initiatives applicable to higher levels of conflict as directed by Presidential policy. The President's FY-83 Budget is the baseline for this review; this baseline is not being re-evaluated.

(TS/B) In response to the conferees' concerns expressed in their report and the issues raised in your recent letters, I would like to summarize the Defense position on [redacted] in several key areas.

(TS/B) We certainly agree with your point that [redacted] cannot be a substitute for or compete with our tactical reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft (e.g. TR-1/SR-71/RF-4C) are absolutely necessary to provide the bulk of the timely tactical information required for engaged combat forces. [redacted] complements these aircraft by providing the ability to cover targets deep behind enemy lines unencumbered by overflight limitations and without exposing flight personnel and aircraft resources to hostile enemy fire. [redacted] will specifically provide the theater commanders with the ability to [redacted]

[redacted] This is consistent with Air Force testimony before your Committee on 1 April 1982 and previously submitted budget justification material which have highlighted the complementary nature of the tactical reconnaissance aircraft [redacted]

(TS/B) I am confident that [redacted] in the NATO environment will provide a sufficient quantity of high quality information in a timely enough manner to significantly improve our warning posture. As you pointed out, SIGINT was not specifically considered in the study referenced; however, the SIGINT contribution has been previously analyzed as part of an overall series of studies. Collectively, these studies do constitute an all-source analysis with the ultimate conclusion that [redacted] would provide a substantial increase in high confidence warning information and intelligence support to our combat commanders in Europe.

(TS/B) I recognize that SIGINT and HUMINT are invaluable contributors to many of the intelligence needs of our military forces, but to be used most effectively they must be complemented by imagery. A combination of SIGINT and IMINT can provide detailed, time sensitive, and high confidence assessments of hostile force posture in critical areas. HUMINT contributions can vary widely from one situation to another and we cannot be assured of having a credible source at the right place and time with an adequate means for communicating information.

(TS/B) We have also addressed the ability of [redacted]

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As : suggest,

cost-effectiveness and practicality of widespread use of such measures is questionable. In addition, the

will for the enormously complicate the whole issue of Soviets, and require far more costly measures which would place additional demands on the Soviet defense budget.

(TS/B) I am confident that the quality of the imagery will be adequate to satisfy the majority of both the national and Defense requirements. This opinion is based upon a large body of image interpreter data. Some 90 evaluations/studies specifically dealing with the interpretability

(TS/B) which has served to streamline its development and acquisition. The apportioning of the cost growth funding between the as the conference report language stated, would at this stage only serve to complicate the management of the program.

(TS/B) Our combat commanders need an assured flow of timely imagery. They are deeply concerned by our current

Even with the advent of the in the late 1980's,

While I recognize that overhead imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT and Defense tactical and strategic reconnaissance will all be used synergistically to produce the best intelligence products, I am convinced that the incremental value of will greatly improve our overall intelligence posture and our support to combat operations.

(TS/B) If you or your colleagues have continued concerns about , both Bill Casey and I would be pleased to meet with you personally and respond directly to any additional questions.

Sincerely,

Frank C. Carlucci
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc:
Honorable Barry Goldwater

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